"Easy practical knowledge," Journal of Philosophy (with Adam Carter). [link]

Practical knowledge is "easy."

"Epistemic cans," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (with Chris Willard-Kyle). [link]

*Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2023*

S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p.


"Agentive modals and agentive modality: a cautionary tale," American Philosophical Quarterly (with Robert Wallace). [link]

Reductive conditional analyses of agentive modality always take a kernel of agentive modality for granted.


"Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat," Synthese. [link]

We don't need two theories of defeasibility, one for knowledge-that, and another for knowledge-how.

"What we know when we act," Philosophical Studies. [link]

I reconcile the causalist idea that intentional action has distinguished causal antecedents with the Anscombean idea that intentional action has distinguished epistemological features.

"Epistemic control without voluntarism," Philosophical Issues, annual supplement to Noûs. [link]

I offer a theory of epistemic control that navigates a route between the Scylla of voluntarism and Charybdis of eliminativism.

"Knowledge from blindspots," in Rodrigo Borges and Ian Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge, Routledge (with Juan Comesaña and Rhys Borchert). [link]

It is possible to gain inferential knowledge from blindspot propositions.


"A plea for exemptions," Erkenntnis. [link]

I articulate a theory of epistemic exemptions.

"Evidentialism and the problem of basic competence," Ergo. [link]

Evidentialists about inferential justification have a hard time explaining the normative role of competence in inference.


"Conocimiento, justificación, y clausura en la epistemología de Sosa," in David Perez Chico and Modesto Gómez Alonso (eds.), Ernesto Sosa: Conocimiento y Vertud, Zaragoza University Press (with Juan Comesaña).

We critically examine some recent trends in Sosa's work, especially his Epistemic Explanations.


"Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs," Philosophical Studies. [link]

I consider whether Greco's (2014) Fragmentation Analysis of epistemic akrasia can accommodate higher-order akrasia.

In Progress

Email me for drafts of:

A book about action and knowledge (with Adam Carter)

A paper on fear (with Robert Wallace)

A few papers on faultless irrationality

A few papers on intentional action